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Abstract 
 
We study the relationship between discretionary fiscal policy and macroeconomic stability in 21 
OECD countries over the 1985-2012 period. The novelties of our contribution lie in the use of annual 
panel data, whereas most of the existing evidence is cross-sectional, and more importantly in the 
thorough investigation of how fiscal rules affect the policy-macroeconomic stability relationship. We 
find that the aggressive use of discretionary fiscal policy, particularly of government consumption 
items, leads to higher volatility of both output and inflation. However, when strict fiscal rules are 
introduced, discretionary policy becomes output-stabilising rather than destabilising. This result can 
be more easily achieved by rules on balanced budgets, rather than on expenditures, revenues, or debt. 
On the other hand, fiscal rules are unable to affect the inflation-destabilising nature of discretionary 
policy, probably because of the higher importance of central banks in that respect. 
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1. Introduction  
Recent events such as the ongoing European sovereign debt crisis that followed the 2007-09 financial 
crisis have highlighted the relevance of the attempts to keep under control government balances and to 
reinforce budgetary procedures (Spilimbergo et al., 2008; Hauptmeier et al., 2011). There is now a 
lively debate on the necessity to restore sound public finance and limit the discretion of governments 
in many industrialised countries. In particular, the adoption of fiscal rules strengthening fiscal 
discipline (sometimes referred to as fiscal performance, see e.g. Kennedy and Robbins 2003) and 
reducing both the deficit bias and political failures starts to be viewed favourably by policy makers 
and researchers alike (see, e.g., Debrun et al. 2008 for an analysis on national deficits, and Foremny 
2014 for one on sub-national ones). 
Although the impact of rules on fiscal discipline is an interesting topic and bears important 
implications for the fiscal behaviour of governments at all levels, we believe that concentrating on the 
sole disciplinary role of such rules constitutes too narrow of an approach. Running balanced budgets 
is, indeed, not valuable per se:
1
 it matters for what it implies for other macroeconomic targets. 
Musgrave (1969) wrote that governments should focus on three main goals: macroeconomic 
stabilisation, efficiency in resource allocation, and income redistribution. The importance of 
macroeconomic stabilisation has been also recently highlighted by, among others, Blinder (2004) who 
points out that, especially in occasional abnormal circumstances (e.g., when recessions are extremely 
long and/or deep), monetary policy can be used to stimulate the economy, while fiscal policy is better 
suited for the role of macroeconomic stabiliser.  
The latter part of this statement is the focus of our paper. In particular, we aim at understanding if 
the existence of fiscal rules affects the effectiveness of the governments’ macroeconomic stabilisation 
function. While automatic stabilisers certainly play a key role for the stabilisation of output in 
response to business cycle developments, the role of discretionary fiscal policy is harder to pinpoint a 
priori. The existing empirical evidence finds a destabilising impact on the economy of the latter, that 
is of the government’s voluntary corrections of expenditure and/or taxation not taken in response to 
                                                 
1
 But it can certainly help to avoid problems such as those generated by too large fiscal imbalances. 
 2 
cyclical developments (Furceri 2007, Afonso and Furceri 2008, Loayza et al. 2007). In light of the 
recent and widespread introduction of fiscal rules it seems natural to investigate whether such rules 
influence how discretionary fiscal policy affects macroeconomic stability. 
Fiscal rules, usually defined as formalised numerical restrictions on relevant aggregate fiscal 
variables, have been recognised as institutions capable of affecting fiscal outcomes in addition to, e.g., 
election systems, political parties, government fragmentation, and the organisation of the budget 
process (Ferejohn and Krehibel 1987; von Hagen 1992; von Hagen and Harden 1995; Kopits and 
Symansky 1998; Alesina and Perotti 1999; European Commission 2006; Cottarelli and Schaechter 
2010). Since numerical fiscal rules establish clear benchmarks and targets with which actual policies 
can be compared, they can provide a focal point for the governments undertaking fiscal adjustments 
and post-crisis fiscal consolidation processes (Guichard et al. 2007; Kumar et al. 2009).
2
  
Over the past two decades, fiscal rules have spread worldwide. In 1990, only five countries 
(Germany, Indonesia, Japan, Luxembourg, and the United States) had fiscal rules in place that 
covered at least the central government level. Since then, the number of countries with national and/or 
supranational fiscal rules has surged to 76 by mid-2012 (Schaechter et al. 2012). It is important to 
point out that there could be important differences between de jure and de facto fiscal rules depending 
on their effectiveness.
3
 Wyplosz (2011) suggests that governments may gain public support to 
introduce rules believed to ensure the interest of society, only to disregard those rules when 
effectively constraining the governmental actions.  
In terms of our empirical analysis, existing datasets on fiscal rules (like those provided by the 
IMF and the European Commission) only measure de jure rules, in particular those that have taken 
effects already, or where clear transition regimes have been specified. As Schaechter et al. (2012) put 
it, to what degree rules have been adhered to in practices can be considered as an important area for 
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 For example, in Estonia an externally-imposed fiscal rule has acted as a major focal point in guiding deficit-
reduction efforts (Raudla 2013). The findings by Lavigne (2011) and Price (2010) suggest that fiscal rules can 
be used by governments as a political 'cover' when implementing austerity measures, should they turn out to be 
unpopular. However, Kumar et al. (2007) affirm that the simple adoption of fiscal rules does not generally 
appear to be sufficient to support sustained fiscal adjustment efforts. 
3
 For instance, in the US the targets set by the Deficit Control Act of 1985 were initially met in part through the 
sale of government assets and in part by moving expenditures 'off-budget'. After exhausting this strategy, the 
deficit targets were adjusted upward in 1987 and again in 1990 (Inman 1998). Similar considerations apply to 
the golden rule in Germany (Baumann et al. 2008).  
 3 
future research. The results of our paper (and indeed of the vast majority of the existing literature) 
should be read with this important caveat in mind.  
Given that a wide range of fiscal rules is conceivable and that the design of the appropriate fiscal 
framework depends on country-specific circumstances (von Hagen 2006a Hallerberg et al. 2007 and 
2009; Ljungman 2008), it is hard to comment on the general effectiveness of fiscal rules. Wyplosz 
(2005), for instance, argues that neither strict rules nor full discretion are optimal to ensure fiscal 
discipline, drawing a parallel to monetary policy where most central banks adopt flexible inflation 
targeting strategies rather than strictly abiding to rules (Svensson 2005). More recently, Wyplosz 
(2011) has concluded that rules and institutions should be combined with advisory fiscal councils to 
ensure that budget balances are kept under control. Schick (2010) also supports this view, mentioning 
the so-called ‘next-generation fiscal rules’ (see also Lienert 2010 and Schaechter et al. 2012 on 
related topics).
4
  
The literature evaluating the first generation fiscal rules mostly expresses a positive verdict. 
Guichard et al. (2007) find that rules targeting expenditure are associated with larger and longer fiscal 
adjustments. Manasse (2007) and Debrun et al. (2008) claim that rules limit the pro-cylclicality of 
fiscal behaviour. Sub-national rules in federal countries such as the US and Switzerland have also 
been extensively studied. Alesina and Bayoumi (1996) show that in the US states balanced budget 
rules are effective in enforcing fiscal discipline and that they have no costs in terms of increased 
output variability. Similar findings are offered by Poterba (1994), Alt and Lowry (1994), Bayoumi 
and Eichengreen (1995), all claiming that US state-level fiscal restrictions contribute to lower deficits 
and to react faster to negative fiscal shocks. As for Switzerland, Feld and Kirchgassner (2008) praise 
the success of rules in forcing sub-national governments to follow strictly sustainable policies without 
any intervention of the national government. Krogstrup and Walti (2008) also prove that fiscal rules 
significantly affect the real budget balances of the Swiss sub-federal jurisdictions.
5
 
                                                 
4
 ‘Next-generation fiscal rules’ are designed to strike a better balance between sustainability and flexibility 
goals: they usually account for economic shocks and are often complemented by other institutional 
arrangements. 
5
 We have thought of performing an empirical investigation of the effects of fiscal rules on the stabilisation 
function of federal governments only. However, our sample only includes four federal countries (Belgium, 
Canada, Switzerland, and the US) and restricting the sample to such a small number of countries is not likely to 
 4 
In general, most of the existing literature deals with the appraisal of the ability of fiscal rules to 
address the sources of the deficit-bias, and tries to understand whether rules constitute a sufficient 
condition to get sustainable fiscal parameters. And what about the effects of fiscal rules on the 
stabilisation function of fiscal policy? The literature has hardly investigated this research question, but 
it offers a number of theoretical and empirical contributions on the effects of fiscal policy on 
macroeconomic volatility. For example, Gali (1994) constructs a theoretical framework predicting 
output-stabilising effects of government purchases, then proved wrong by the empirical analysis 
presented in the same article. Since then, a number of researchers have tested the relationship between 
fiscal policy and macroeconomic stability using measures of discretionary policy rather than readily 
available fiscal series. The seminal article by Fatas and Mihov (2003) is particularly enlightening: 
they firstly estimate a measure of discretionary fiscal policy starting from a government expenditure 
series in order to exclude endogenous fiscal reactions to economic conditions, and then investigate its 
effects on output volatility. Conclusions suggest that the aggressive use of fiscal policy reduces 
macroeconomic stability. Rother (2004) presents similar results focusing on inflation volatility. 
Subsequent studies are broadly in line with those initial findings (see, among others, Herrera and 
Vincent 2008), with some exceptions. For example, Badinger (2009) confirms the positive 
relationship between discretionary policy and output volatility, but not that between the former and 
inflation volatility, using data for OECD countries. Most of the studies of the effects of discretionary 
fiscal policy on macroeconomic stability follow the strategy introduced by Fatas and Mihov (2003). 
However, most studies concentrate on the US economy and results are usually based on cross-
sectional analyses (e.g., Fatas and Mihov 2001, 2006). 
Our paper contributes to the literature along several lines. First, we estimate discretionary fiscal 
policy using several alternative measures of government intervention, something that allows for a 
better disentangling of the cyclical and the structural components of fiscal policy. Then, we analyse 
the relationship between discretionary fiscal policy and macroeconomic stability, i.e. output volatility 
as well as inflation volatility, employing annual panel data rather than adopting a cross-sectional 
                                                                                                                                                        
lead to reliable results. A better approach would be to consider data at the regional/state level for such federal 
countries, but this goes beyond the scope of the present paper and it can constitute material for future research.  
 5 
approach as done in most of the existing literature. In particular, we use multi-year periods data 
(three-year periods are used as a benchmark) for a sample of 21 OECD countries that, to the best of 
our knowledge, have never been used before in this context.
6
 Then, and most importantly, we study 
how this relationship is affected by the existence of national fiscal rules.
7
 In all cases we control for 
potential endogeneity issues that are widely recognised to affect this type of analysis, and we provide 
a substantial number of robustness checks to support the validity of our conclusions.  
Our results are the following. First, despite using the same econometric model to extract the 
discretionary component of fiscal policy from government expenditure series, the choice of the series 
to be used (i.e. government consumption, consumption and investment, or primary spending) matters 
and yields different results. Second, the panel estimates of the effects of discretionary policy on 
macroeconomic stability mostly confirm the existing cross-sectional evidence, with aggressive use of 
fiscal policy leading to higher volatility of output and of inflation. However, and third, fiscal rules can 
alter the relationship between discretionary policy and output stability, to the point that the former 
may enhance output stability when coupled with strict-enough fiscal rules. Moreover, not all types of 
rules are equally effective: in particular, rules on balanced budgets are more effective than those 
targeting different aggregates such as expenditures, revenues, or debt. On the other hand, no matter 
the degree of stringency, fiscal rules seem to be unable to mitigate the inflation-destabilising effects of 
discretionary policy. This latter result seems reasonable, given the influence of monetary policy in 
keeping inflation under control more so than fiscal policy. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 illustrates the empirical strategy and 
the variables used to construct the measures of discretionary fiscal policy. Section 3 deals with the 
relationship between discretionary fiscal policy and output volatility, while section 4 concentrates on 
                                                 
6
 There are previous works, mostly limited to the US case, studying the influence of fiscal rules on the 
relationship between fiscal policy and macroeconomic stability (see e.g. Bayoumi and Eichengreen 1995; 
Alesina and Bayoumi 1996; Fatas and Mihov 2006). However, the time variability of the data has not been 
exploited in a panel context. The use of panel data by Rother (2004) constitutes an exception, but he only deals 
with inflation volatility and does not investigate the role played by fiscal rules as we do in the second part of the 
empirical analysis. 
7
 Note that we purposely leave out of the analysis supranational fiscal rules, as their effectiveness has been 
questioned by many, particularly in the countries adhering to the eurozone (Wyplosz 2006; Ayuso-i-Casals et al. 
2007; Debrun and Kumar 2007).  
 6 
the relationship between the former and inflation volatility. Finally, section 5 concludes and provides 
some policy implications. 
 
2. Estimating discretionary fiscal policy  
Discretionary fiscal policy series are not readily available in existing datasets and there is no 
consensus in the literature on how to appropriately obtain them (see Furceri and Ribeiro 2009 for a 
detailed discussion). The existing estimates are mostly based on expenditure-side series, such as 
government consumption (Afonso et al. 2010), government consumption plus investment (Blanchard 
and Perotti 2002), primary spending and receipts (Gali and Perotti 2003), or total real state 
government spending (Fatas and Mihov 2006). In all cases the aim is to distinguish the cyclical (i.e. 
endogenous) component of the budget from the discretionary (i.e. structural) component for each 
spending aggregate.  
It would be inappropriate to simply use cyclically adjusted series (which are available for most 
advanced countries) because the discretionary component of a fiscal policy series may be in turn 
decomposed into one further endogenous component, representing policy measures taken in response 
to the business cycle, and a purely exogenous one. The latter represents the fiscal shocks that are 
normally thought to proxy for the aggressive use of fiscal policy (Gali and Perotti 2003), and it is the 
discretionary policy measure that we are interested in. There is no theoretical guidance on which 
series should be used as the starting point for the estimates, and this is why authors take different 
decisions on this (see Fatas and Mihov 2003; Badinger 2009). On the other hand, there is a certain 
consensus on how to obtain the discretionary fiscal shocks, normally recovered by estimating country-
specific models (panel estimates would not yield discretionary policy estimates for each country). 
This section deals with the estimation of those shocks. The objective of this specific part of the 
analysis is not to innovate on the existing literature: rather, we purposely adopt a standard approach so 
to ensure that the results that we are interested in (those about the influence of fiscal rules on the 
macroeconomic stabilisation function presented in the following part of the paper) are not driven by 
 7 
non-standard choices in the first stage. We use the following model to recover the fiscal shocks used 
to measure discretionary policy: 
 
2 _
0 1 1 2 1 2ln _ ln _ ln
discr fp
t t t tspending spending gdp trend                 , (1) 
 
where spending_ is a measure of real government expenditure, gdp is real GDP, π is inflation rate 
(included in both level and squared forms),
8
 and trend is a linear time trend. The main object of 
interest of equation (1) is 
_discr fp
t , which is to be interpreted as a discretionary fiscal shock. Its 
volatility, i.e. its standard deviation over a certain time period, is normally considered as an indicator 
of the aggressiveness of a government’s discretionary fiscal stance.  
We estimate three different specifications of model (1) by using three alternative government 
spending series as the dependent variable one at a time: government consumption (spending_gc); 
consumption plus investment (spending_gci); primary expenditure (i.e. total disbursements minus 
interest payments, spending_gpe).
9
 As stated above, there are no criteria to select the most appropriate 
spending series to be used as the dependent variable in model (1). It is conceivable that all three 
expenditure series listed above contain both cyclical and structural components. Primary expenditure 
is the most comprehensive of the three series that we use (containing all spending items except for 
interest payments), and government consumption the narrowest. Thus, we will distinguish the 
resulting discretionary fiscal policy series accordingly: the broadest one obtained from primary 
expenditure (discr_gpe), the middle one obtained from consumption plus investment (discr_gci), and 
the narrowest measure obtained from government consumption (discr_gc).  
                                                 
8
 The inflation rate is included on the right-hand-side to ensure that our results are not determined by high-
inflation episodes during which the co-movement between real government spending and output might be due to 
monetary instability instead of fiscal policy. Controlling for inflation is also important as the variables are 
expressed in real terms, but spending (especially government consumption) is typically budgeted in nominal 
terms. Thus, inflation shocks are likely to affect public expenditure and a possible nonlinear relationship 
between inflation and spending may take place. Hence, inflation squared is also included to control for this 
possibility.  
9
 For the sake of completeness, we also performed the analysis using as dependent variables primary receipts 
and the primary balance (both unadjusted and cyclically adjusted) to get alternative measures of discretionary 
fiscal shocks (as in Badinger 2009). We use them for robustness purposes as detailed below but we prefer to 
concentrate on the measures obtained from government spending series consistently with the previous literature. 
 8 
We estimate model (1) for every country of our sample over the period 1961-2012 (at most).
10
 In 
order to tackle potential endogeneity, we estimate the various specifications of the model with the 
2SLS estimator, where real GDP is instrumented with two of its own lags, the logarithm of the oil 
price, and the rest of the explanatory variables of the model (see Fatas and Mihov 2003, 2006, and 
Badinger 2009 for a similar application).
11
  
We then calculate the standard deviation over three-year periods of the fiscal shocks just 
estimated to construct the measures of aggressiveness of discretionary fiscal policy. This represents 
the first step of the empirical analysis. We use such measures to investigate their impact on output 
volatility and inflation volatility, by including them as the main explanatory variable of the models in 
the second part of the analysis (see the next two Sections for more details).  
Table 1 shows that the positive correlation among the three measures of discretionary fiscal policy 
estimated with equation (1) is substantial, particularly between discr_gc and discr_gci. discr_gc is 
also substantially positively correlated with discr_gpe (0.46), while the correlation between the latter 
and discr_gci is positive but lower (0.31). The fact that correlations are never equal to one 
foreshadows the fact that different series will yield different results.
12
  
 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
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 The countries are: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, 
Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United 
Kingdom, and United States. For most countries there are no missing observations in the government 
consumption specification (the exceptions being Germany and Ireland, for which observations start in 1991 and 
1990 respectively). In the other two specifications the sample is limited to about 20 observations in the cases of 
Luxembourg and Switzerland; and to about 30 observations in the cases of France, Iceland, and Portugal. The 
sample is therefore made by OECD countries all at comparable stages of development and the choices are 
mostly dictated by data availability issues. 
11
 The choice of instrumenting real GDP by the oil price is quite standard in the literature pointing out that 
measures of oil price and its shocks are good predictors of output (Mork 1989; Dotsey and Reid 1992; Ferderer 
1997; Lee and Ni 2002). It has been pointed out that the oil price may be used as an instrument for inflation as 
well, but at this stage we are only interested in applying a standard estimation strategy so to obtain reliable 
discretionary policy series. 
12
 Our results compare well with those of Badinger (2009), who also estimates discretionary policy using several 
alternative fiscal policy series. In particular, we obtain a higher correlation between discr_gc and discr_gci, but 
a lower one among those two and discr_gpe with respect to Badinger (2009). Also, for robustness purposes we 
have re-estimated model (1) excluding the years of the recent crisis, and the correlations among the shocks 
obtained from this sub-sample and those arising from the full sample (not reported for the sake of brevity) are 
reassuringly high. We use the full sample results to avoid affecting the time dimension of the panel estimates in 
the following part of the analysis. 
 9 
3. Discretionary fiscal policy and output volatility 
This section illustrates the empirical model used to study the relationship between discretionary fiscal 
policy and output volatility, and reports the estimated results. Sub-section 3.1 deals with the typical 
model used in the literature, although the fact that we estimate it using annual panel data constitutes a 
novelty. More importantly, we deal with the role of fiscal rules by appropriately enriching the model 
in sub-section 3.2.  
 
3.1 The standard model 
We carry out this second part of the analysis using data from 1985 to 2012. We restrict the sample to 
this time span because fiscal rules were basically non-existent before and we prefer to simplify the 
comparison between this first model and the richer one taking into account the role played by the 
rules. The benchmark model is the following: 
 
,[ , 2] 1 ,[ , 2] 1 ,[ , 2] ,ln _
gdp
i t t i t t i t t i t i tdiscr fp           W ,   (2) 
 
where ,[ , 2]
gdp
i t t   is the standard deviation of the growth rate of real GDP per capita over the three-
year periods, standing for output volatility. discr_fp is one of the three measures of discretionary 
policy, i.e. the standard deviation of the discretionary shocks εdiscr_fp obtained from model (1), used 
separately one at a time. ,[ , 2]i t tW  is a vector of controls including government size (gov_size, 
calculated as government primary expenditure divided by GDP
13
), openness (open, the KOF 
globalization index whose construction is explained in Dreher (2006) and Dreher et al. (2008)), and 
the logarithm of real GDP per capita (gdp_level). In an alternative specification of the model we use 
the volatility of private-GDP as the dependent variable for robustness purposes (we calculate private-
GDP by subtracting from GDP the appropriate government expenditure – depending on the utilised 
                                                 
13
 We avoid using the frequently used government size series taken from the Penn World Tables (Heston et al. 
2012) given the shortcoming noted by Knowles (2001), namely that that series is calculated imposing a set of 
PPPs prices that may yield imprecise values.  
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measure of discretionary policy). All variables are expressed as averages over non-overlapping three-
year periods. i and t are individual and time fixed effects, respectively. 
Although model (2) is basically taken from the literature on the subject, it is usually estimated 
with cross-sectional data. Badinger (2009) constitutes an exception in offering panel estimates of this 
model with quarterly data. However, using quarterly data when dealing with fiscal policy can be quite 
problematic, as most fiscal data at that frequency usually result from interpolations or estimations 
based on fiscal information additional to the yearly budget (see, e.g., Paredes et al. 2009). As a result, 
quarterly fiscal data may incorrectly represent a country’s fiscal policy stance: most governments do 
not revise their budgets on a quarterly schedule, while many do it once per year. Thus, the novelty of 
our first set of results lies in the use of multi-periods annual panel data, which puts to the test the 
existing results of the literature that normally highlight a positive correlation between discretionary 
fiscal policy and GDP volatility.  
The main object of interest in model (2) is φ1, whose sign indicates whether discretionary fiscal 
policy contributes to the output stability of the countries under observation (a negative coefficient 
would indicate that it does).  We estimate equation (2) using the System-GMM estimator (developed 
by Arellano and Bover 1995; Blundell and Bond 1998), that is a recommended choice when the time 
dimension is small, for instance when variables are observed in multi-year periods as in our case 
(Bond et al. 2001). The GMM estimator also deals with the potential endogeneity of the fiscal policy 
variables (discr_fp and gov_size), a well-known issue affecting this type of models: as argued by 
Rodrik (1998), more volatile economies may have an incentive to set up larger governments.  
Given the difficulty of finding proper exogenous instruments for those two variables, we use their 
own values two periods before, i.e. their second lags, as instruments (consistently with the tests for 
autocorrelation of second order, Arellano and Bond 1991). We also use the following variables 
excluded from the model as instruments for gov_size (drawing from the work by, among others, Fatas 
and Mihov 2001): the logarithm of total population (pop), the dependency ratio (dep_ratio) and the 
urbanisation rate (urban). Finally, we treat as predetermined openness and the level of real GDP per 
capita, and we use them as instruments in the levels equation. 
 11 
We report the results for the one-step GMM estimators that have been found to be more reliable 
for finite sample inference as the asymptotic standard errors associated with the two-step GMM 
estimators can be seriously biased downwards (see Blundell and Bond 1998; Bond et al. 2001; 
Madariaga and Poncet 2007). The results reported in Table 2 are obtained with GDP volatility used as 
the dependent variable in the first three columns of the table (these columns differ depending on the 
discretionary fiscal policy series included among the right-hand-side variables), while private-GDP 
volatility is the dependent variable in the remaining columns.  
 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
The results confirm previous findings on the positive relationship between aggressive use of 
discretionary fiscal policy and output volatility, meaning that government spending volatility 
adversely affects output stability. This result is robust to different measures of discretionary fiscal 
policy (the coefficients of the latter are positive in all cases, although the discr_gpe one is not 
statistically significant at conventional levels), and the magnitude of the effect is economically 
meaningful and higher when narrower spending measures are used, i.e. government consumption 
(discr_gc) and government consumption plus investment (discr_gci). On average, a one percent 
increase in volatility of discretionary fiscal policy increases output volatility - i.e. worsens 
macroeconomic stability - by between 0.36 and 0.48 percentage points according to the discr_gci and 
to the discr_gc specifications, respectively. The estimated elasticity in the discr_gpe case lies between 
the two, being slightly larger than 0.36.  
These elasticities are smaller than those of Fatas and Mihov (2003) who estimate the same 
elasticity to be equal to 0.80 using government spending for a sample of 91 countries over the period 
1960-2000. Their estimated elasticity is larger than ours possibly because of their sample including 
emerging economies which may experience a larger influence of fiscal policy on the volatility of 
output than developed countries. Despite this difference, we can certainly borrow their conclusions 
and confirm that discretionary fiscal policy does induce significant fluctuations in economic activity. 
 12 
Moreover, our results suggest that most of the output-destabilising effects of discretionary 
expenditure pertain to public investment as well as to other spending items belonging to the 
government consumption aggregate (e.g., the expenses and purchases necessary for the functioning of 
the public administration). Many governments, particularly in the European Union, have recently 
focused on cutting the latter in order to implement austerity measures taken as a response to the great 
recession and its effects on public finances (e.g., Italy, as specified in the legislative decree D.L. 
78/2010). Our estimates suggest that manipulating such public spending item may yield additional, 
and possibly unexpected, effects on the volatility of output that may be either positive or negative 
depending on the resulting volatility of the spending item itself. 
Given that government expenditure is an important part of GDP, the result that aggressively using 
fiscal policy leads to more volatile output may seem partly tautological: volatile public spending may 
lead to a volatile output just because it is included in it. The results of the estimation of model (2) 
when the volatility of GDP excluding government expenditure is used as the dependent variable 
confirm that the previous results are not driven by the fact that GDP includes public expenditure (see 
Table 2, private GDP volatility columns). In this case the coefficient related to discr_gpe is highly 
statistically significant. The elasticities based on those alternative estimates are in all cases 
comparable to those estimated earlier and higher in magnitude (between 0.42 and 0.44). 
As for the controls, richer countries seem to face higher output volatility, as the coefficient of real 
GDP per capita is estimated to be positive in all specifications, and in all cases but one statistically 
different from zero. The inclusion of period fixed effects reveals to be appropriate, as most of their 
coefficients are significantly different from zero at standard levels. Given that the reference period, 
i.e. the omitted dummy, is the most recent one, it seems that output volatility has always been lower in 
the first part of the sample. This is not surprising, given that the last period includes the turmoil 
following the recent crisis and the resulting recession. Finally, the diagnostic tests do not reveal strong 
evidence against the models: the Hansen test does not reject the null of valid instruments in any of the 
specifications. The AR(2) test never indicates second order serial correlation in the case of GPD 
volatility (but it does in two of the three private-GDP specifications).  
 13 
We have carried out a number of robustness checks in order to ensure that the above results do not 
depend on specific sampling and modelling choices. First of all, we have re-estimated model (2) using 
the 2SLS estimator to check whether the choice of the system-GMM turns out to be crucial for the 
results. Table A2 in the Appendix contains the estimated coefficients of the discr_gc specification of 
model (2) where the endogenous variables (that is, the two fiscal policy series gov_size and discr_gc) 
are instrumented with two lags of themselves, the three exogenous instruments pop, dep_ratio, urban, 
and the rest of the variables of the model (Table A3 presents the first stage results). In order to 
facilitate the comparison with the 2SLS estimates, Table A2 also reports the GMM results in the first 
two columns. The 2SLS results reassuringly confirm the above findings, and in particular the positive 
relationship between discretionary fiscal policy and the volatility of both GDP and private GDP. 
Standard diagnostics tests do not reveal any issue with the estimates. Table A2 also demonstrates why 
we prefer to use the system-GMM estimator as our benchmark: when using lags as instruments, it 
permits to use more observations than the 2SLS one. In this case, we are able to use 183 observations 
when estimating the model with the system-GMM, and only 141 when using the 2SLS. 
A second robustness check deals with the choice of the expenditure series to calculate the 
discretionary policy variables. As stated above, we have also estimated alternative specifications of 
model (1) using the following: primary receipts, net lending, and cyclically adjusted net lending. The 
first three columns of table A4 present the coefficients of model (2)  when the discretionary policy 
measures are based on those three alternative variables (in this case it is impossible to use private 
GDP volatility as an alternative dependent variable because private GDP can only be calculated using 
an expenditure series). The positive relationship between GDP volatility and discretionary policy is 
once again confirmed, particularly when using primary receipts as the starting fiscal policy series. 
A third robustness check deals with the use of non-overlapping 3-year periods, which could be 
questioned on the ground that three years probably do not cover a full business cycle. While this is 
certainly a possibility, the limited time dimension of our sample prevents us from using 5-year 
periods, most commonly used in macroeconomic analyses to smooth out business cycle fluctuations. 
For this reason, tables A5 and A6 in the Appendix show the results of model (2) estimated over 4-year 
and 2-year periods respectively. The findings contained in both tables effectively confirm the 
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benchmark results. However, we prefer to use the 3-year periods given that the number of 
observations is significantly reduced in the case of 4-year periods, and that the diagnostics of the 2-
year estimates is far from being optimal (also, two years do not seem enough to meaningfully interpret 
the volatility of fiscal policy). 
A final robustness check deals with the specific 3-year periods used in the benchmark analysis. It 
is conceivable that the use of alternative 3-year periods, i.e. starting in different years (1986 and 1987 
respectively: the dataset used for the benchmark results starts in 1985), may lead to different results. 
The estimates presented in table A7 rule out this possibility, as the benchmark results do not seem to 
be affected by the use of specific periods, no matter the dependent variable of model (2), that is the 
volatility of either GDP or private GDP.  
 
3.2 The effects of fiscal rules 
Overall, the previous results suggest that the aggressive use of discretionary fiscal policy is likely to 
reduce output stability. This lower stability in turn may adversely affect economic welfare and growth 
(Fatas and Mihov 2003), and it is probably among the reasons leading to the adoption of fiscal rules 
capable of restricting the possibility of governments to aggressively use fiscal policy. It is easily 
conceivable that fiscal rules can affect the governmental macroeconomic stabilisation function by 
influencing both expenditure and revenue side instruments. However, it is hard to understand a priori 
the way in which such rules will influence the role played by governments for macroeconomic 
stability. 
On the one hand, national fiscal rules are institutions capable of increasing the transparency of 
the public budget, thus potentially improving government effectiveness and accountability (Blume 
and Voigt 2103). Budgetary transparency requirements related to the adoption of numerical fiscal 
rules may also significantly affect fiscal policy and governability. The permanent constraints on fiscal 
and budgetary items imposed by fiscal rules are likely to contribute to macroeconomic stability by 
helping countries to avoid unsustainable fiscal policies and improve fiscal performance management 
systems (Lavigne 2011).  
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On the other hand, as fiscal rules are normally used to constrain budgetary variables – especially 
on the expenditure side with expenditure ceilings (e.g., in Sweden) and spending review measures 
(e.g., in Italy recently) –, they can lead to smaller public sectors, possibly weakening the effectiveness 
of the stabilisation function of fiscal policy. As a matter of fact, there is some evidence proving that 
larger governments have experienced milder economic fluctuations than countries with smaller 
governments (Galì 1994). Moreover, fiscal rules imposing balanced budget targets may work against 
the tax-smoothing theory of budget deficits (Barro 1979) and in turn harm stability. Such rules may 
reduce the government’s flexibility in using deficits and surpluses as a buffer during economic 
downturns and other emergencies (Alesina and Perotti 1999), again with adverse consequences on the 
stabilisation function of national governments.  
This section investigates whether the existence of fiscal rules affects the relationship between the 
discretionary component of government spending and output volatility. We estimate an enriched 
version of model (2) that includes among the right-hand-side variables a measure of fiscal rules, and 
its interaction with discretionary fiscal policy. The idea behind the introduction of the interaction term 
is that the existence of fiscal rules may affect the stabilisation function of fiscal policy, although a 
priori it is difficult to say whether it will limit it or enhance it as explained above. The model is the 
following: 
 
,[ , 2] 1 ,[ , 2] 2 ,[ , 2] 3 ,[ , 2] 1 ,[ , 2] ,ln _ _ _ * _
gdp
i t t i t t i t t i t t i t t i t i tdiscr fp rule discr fp rule                 W  (3) 
 
The two new variables with respect to model (2) are: rule_, an index taking a value between 0 and 
5 measuring the extent of fiscal rules with higher values indicating stricter rules
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, and its interaction 
term with discretionary fiscal policy, discr_fp*rule_. There are four types of rules pertaining to 
different budgetary items and public finance targets for which we have indices, and we use them 
separately in different specifications of the model (see below for details). 
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 These indices take into account dimensions such as legal basis, coverage, formal enforcement procedures, 
expenditure ceilings, fiscal responsibility laws, and the existence of independent body setting budget 
assumptions and monitoring the budget implementation (Schaechter et al. 2012). 
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The rules’ data are taken from the Fiscal Rules Dataset published by the IMF (see Kinda et al. 
2013 for details) that has data on national fiscal rules from 1985 to 2012 and covers four types of 
rules: budget balance (rule_bb), debt (rule_d), expenditure (rule_e), and revenue (rule_r) rules. The 
dataset does not contain the rules' indices expressed as scores from 0 to 5: in order to construct those 
we have followed the procedure explained in the paper by Schaechter et al. (2012, see pages 30-35 in 
particular). Thanks to that procedure, we have also generated a fifth composite index, i.e. the overall 
fiscal rules index (rule_overall), which is standardized to range from zero to five like the other 
indices.  
We report the estimates of the model specifications with national rules which cover at least the 
central government. It is worth noting that institutional mechanisms that support fiscal discipline at 
the sub-national level are also clearly important (Sutherland et al. (2005) and Foremny (2014)), 
particularly in federal countries.
15
 However, rules for sub-national governments and fiscal sub-
aggregates (e.g., expenditure caps on particular spending items or those linked to the use of revenues 
from natural resources) are not included in the IMF dataset (Schaechter et al. 2012 state that work on 
that was ongoing, and nothing has been published as of yet). 
The most frequently used rules constrain debt and the fiscal balance, often in combination. 
Shaechter et al. (2012, p. 9) note that "not all types of fiscal rules are equally apt to support the 
sustainability, economic stabilisation, and possibly the size of government objectives, even when its 
design features are fine-tuned." In our sample, for instance, only four countries (Belgium, Denmark, 
France, and the Netherlands) ever adopted revenue rules, possibly because most of these rules (such 
as ceilings or floors on revenues; rules aimed at boosting revenue collection and/or preventing an 
excessive tax burden) are not directly linked to the control of public debt, as they do not constrain 
spending; thus, they are considered less well suited to ensure the sustainability of public finances. 
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 The experience of the US seems to be particularly relevant. The states typically adjust to revenue downturns 
rather quickly, and most likely because of their balanced budget rules, they do not smooth expenditures over the 
business cycle through borrowing.  In fact, the revenues and expenditures of the US states are both extremely 
pro-cyclical. Negative revenue shocks are met with rapid expenditure cuts.  In the most recent downturns, these 
cuts have been so severe as to almost completely offset the impact of any federal government attempts at fiscal 
stimulus (Rodden and Wibbels 2010, Rodden 2012). 
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However, for the sake of completeness we provide estimations using all the five types of indicators 
for which data are available. 
We estimate equation (3) with the System-GMM estimator as before. In this case, we also treat as 
endogenous the interaction term between discretionary policy and fiscal rules.
16
 Table 3 contains the 
results of model (3) with discr_gpe as the measure of discretionary fiscal policy and the five types of 
fiscal rules' indicators used separately one at a time (accordingly, there are five columns in the table). 
Table 4 shows the estimates when discr_gc is used instead, similarly organised. For the sake of 
brevity, we do not report the estimates of the discr_gci specification as the results (available upon 
request) are remarkably similar to those of the discr_gc specification. 
 
INSERT TABLES 3&4 ABOUT HERE 
 
These new estimates confirm the positive relationship between aggressiveness of discretionary 
fiscal policy and output volatility, with positive coefficients associated with both discr_gpe and 
discr_gc in all specifications (statistically significant in all but the first of the discr_gc specifications). 
However, due to the inclusion of the interaction term between the discretionary policy variable and 
the rules’ indices, those coefficients are only indicative of the policy effects when there are no fiscal 
rules in place, i.e. the value of the rule_ index is equal to zero. In such case, elasticities for average 
values of the variables lie within the 0.23-0.31 and 0.45-0.54 for discr_gpe and discr_gc respectively. 
It is therefore important to consider what happens when fiscal rules are introduced. There are 
significant differences between the two tables regarding the rules’ coefficients and those of the 
interaction terms. The estimates in Table 3 (discr_gpe specification) surprisingly indicate that the 
existence of fiscal rules contributes to increase GDP volatility (the rule_ coefficients are always 
positive and significant at standard levels with the only exception of the one measuring expenditure 
rules). However, the coefficient of the interaction term discr_gpe*rule_ is negative and statistically 
significant in all cases (the rule_e coefficient is negative but not statistically different from zero), 
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 Results are unaffected when adding to the set of instruments a variable constructed as the interaction between 
rule_ the second lag of discr_fp (Ozer-Balli and Sørensen 2010). 
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suggesting that discretionary fiscal policy may enhance output stability when properly coupled with 
fiscal rules. The quantification of the overall marginal effect of discr_gpe (taking into account its 
interaction with rule_) leads to the finding that the stringency of fiscal rules is crucial for the 
relationship between discretionary fiscal policy and GDP volatility. Figures 1a-1e illustrate how the 
effects of discretionary policy change as fiscal rules of varying degrees of strictness are introduced: 
when there are no fiscal rules in all cases there is a positive relationship between discretionary policy 
and GDP volatility, as the estimates of model (2) revealed. However, as fiscal rules are introduced, 
the positive relationship weakens, and in many cases it becomes a negative one, that is increasing the 
effectiveness of the stabilisation function of fiscal policy. In general, i.e. referring to the rule_overall 
index, when the rules’ indices approach three, on a scale from zero to five, the overall effect of 
discr_gpe on output volatility becomes negative, meaning that fiscal rules mitigate the output-
destabilising impacts of discretionary primary expenditure. Actually, in the case of balanced budget 
rules, rule_bb, the threshold is lower (slightly above one), while in the case of rules on expenditures, 
rule_e, the threshold is higher (above three). This implies that rules on balanced budgets are more 
effective in mitigating the output-destabilising effects of discretionary policy than rules focusing on 
one side of the budget only, i.e. expenditure or revenue.
17
 
What does it mean to have fiscal rules corresponding to a value of three in our measures? There 
are numerous cases in our sample in which the strictness of fiscal rules implies values of, e.g., 
rule_overall higher than the threshold. Canada between 1998 and 2005 is an example: in 1998 the 
government set out a ‘balanced budget or better’ policy as part of a debt repayment plan, with a 
Contingency Reserve and an economic prudence factor built into the federal budget and devoted to 
debt reduction if needed. Other examples include France from 2006 onwards, with strict rules in place 
regarding expenditure (targeted increases of expenditure are to be respected each year) and revenues 
(the allocation of higher than expected tax revenues has to be defined ex ante by central government 
and social securities), as well as Sweden from 2000 onwards (implementing both a nominal 
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 This result is close to that of Debrun et al. (2008) who however investigate the effects of national fiscal rules 
on fiscal discipline. According to their analysis. balanced budget and debt rules have a stronger and significant 
effect in determining higher cyclcically adjusted primary balances, while this is not the case for expenditure 
rules. 
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expenditure ceiling for government consumption and a surplus target for the general government). 
Thus, when strict rules are implemented as it has been recently done by a number of industrialised 
countries, discretionary fiscal policy may become output-stabilising. Obviously, it is important to 
recall that the fiscal rules indices that we refer to are only de jure measures which may not perfectly 
capture the real effectiveness of the rules themselves.  
Moving to Table 4, we can comment on the influence of fiscal rules on the output stabilisation 
function of fiscal policy when government consumption is used to estimate the use discretionary fiscal 
policy. In this case, the signs of the coefficients of both the rules’ indices and their interaction with 
discretionary policy are consistent with those of the previous specification, although with a lower 
statistical significance in general. Figures 2a-2e show how the introduction of rules of various degrees 
of strictness affects the discretionary policy effects on GDP volatility. When there are no rules there is 
a positive relationship, in line with the results of model (2). As rules are introduced, the positive effect 
on volatility diminishes, albeit less than in the case of discr_gpe. This may derive from the fact that 
the budgetary items and targets to which rules are mainly referred to do not necessarily pertain to 
government consumption.  
Diagnostic tests do not reveal specific problems, as the null hypotheses of both the Hansen J test 
statistic and of the AR(2) test are not rejected in any case. As done previously, we have checked the 
robustness of the results just presented by re-estimating model (3) replacing the dependent variable 
with private-GDP volatility. These alternative estimates (not reported but available upon request) 
reveal that findings are robust.  
To conclude on the influence of fiscal rules on the relationship between output stability and 
discretionary policy, one important result seems to be that different measures of the latter can lead to 
different conclusions (similarly to arguments laid out by Blanchard, 1993, Alesina and Perotti 1999). 
Moreover, the existence of strict fiscal rules emerges as a condition capable of radically changing the 
output-destabilising nature of discretionary fiscal policy. On the other hand, the fact that this result is 
not supported by the estimates employing narrow definitions of the latter variable may work in favour 
of the strand of literature casting doubts on the effectiveness of the rules - particularly when they are 
not supported by a strong political commitment and fiscal institutions ensuring effective monitoring, 
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corrective actions, and sanctions (e.g., Wyplosz 2005; von Hagen 2006b).  Finally, not all types of 
fiscal rules are equally relevant for output stabilisation, as those on balanced budgets seem to be more 
effective than others, particularly of those on revenues.  
 
4. Discretionary fiscal policy and inflation volatility 
This section deals with the effects of discretionary fiscal policy on inflation volatility. It is organised 
mimicking Section 3, with an initial model close to those used in the existing literature but estimated 
with panel data, and a second model investigating the role of fiscal rules. 
 
4.1 The standard model 
The following model has been commonly used to analyse the effects of fiscal policy on the volatility 
of inflation (see Rother 2004 among others). We estimate it using non-overlapping three-year periods 
data from 1985 to 2012.  
 
,[ , 2] 1 ,[ , 2] 1 ,[ , 2] ,ln _
infl
i t t i t t i t t i t i tdiscr fp           V ,   (4) 
 
where ,[ , 2]
infl
i t t   is the standard deviation of the inflation rate calculated as its average over the 
three-year periods, standing for inflation volatility. discr_fp is one of the three measures of 
discretionary policy introduced earlier and arising from equation (1), used separately one at a time. 
,[ , 2]i t tV  is a vector of controls including government size (gov_size), openness (open), the inflation 
level (infl_level), and the volatilities (i.e. the standard deviations over the three-year periods) of the 
change in output gap, the money growth rate, and the effective exchange rate (gap_vol, money_vol, 
and exch_vol respectively). Country and period fixed effects (i and t respectively) are again 
controlled for.  
In equation (4), we are prevalently interested in estimating the coefficient χ1, whose sign indicates 
how discretionary fiscal policy affects inflation volatility in the countries of our sample (a negative 
coefficient would indicate that it alleviates inflation instability). We estimate equation (4) using the 
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System-GMM estimator to deal with the potential endogeneity of the fiscal policy variables (discr_fp 
and gov_size) that we instrument using their own second lags. We also use the following variables 
excluded from the model as exogenous instruments for gov_size: the logarithm of total population, the 
dependency ratio, and the urbanisation rate. Finally, we treat as predetermined the rest of the right-
hand-side variables, and we use them as instruments in the levels equation.  
 
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
 
Table 5 displays the estimates of three different specifications of equation (4), one for each 
measure of discretionary fiscal policy included in the model. As in the case of output volatility, the 
discretionary spending coefficients are always estimated to be positive, and highly statistically 
significant in the cases of discr_gci and discr_gc. This suggests that aggressive use of narrowly-
defined fiscal policy, i.e. considering government consumption and investment only, may destabilise 
inflation.  
While evidence of inflation-destabilising effects of fiscal policy confirms the findings by Rother 
(2004), it goes against those of Badinger (2009), who offers panel estimates based on quarterly data in 
addition to cross-sectional ones. It is worth recalling that fiscal quarterly data are problematic, given 
that they mostly result from interpolation. Our estimates indicate that, for average values of the 
variables, every percentage point increase in volatility of discretionary fiscal policy increases inflation 
volatility by between 0.24 - according to the discr_gci specification - and 0.55 percentage points - 
according to the discr_gc specification (the discr_gpe elasticity is equal to 0.17 but it is not 
statistically significant at standard levels). This means that a one percent increase in the volatility of 
discretionary policy increases inflation volatility by between 0.17 and 0.51 percentage points. As for 
the controls, the volatility of money growth is also inflation-destabilising, while the level of inflation 
is positively correlated to its volatility. Both results are reasonable, given the possible link between 
the magnitude of the inflation rate and its volatility, and given the economic links between money 
growth rates and inflation. Contrarily to the output volatility case, period fixed effects turn out to be 
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mostly not statistically significant. Finally, the diagnostic tests do not indicate any issue with the 
estimates.  
Similarly to what we did for GDP volatility, we provide additional estimates checking the 
robustness of the results (see the Appendix). Table A4 contains the findings when using the three 
alternative measures of discretionary fiscal policy based on revenues, net lending, and cyclically 
adjusted net lending as the dependent variable. The inflation-destabilising effect of discretionary 
policy is confirmed by this alternative set of estimates, particularly when using cyclically adjusted net 
lending. Tables A8 and A9 show the estimated coefficients of model (4) when using 4-year and 2-year 
periods respectively. Table A10 reports the results obtained with the two alternative 3-year datasets 
starting in 1986 and 1987 respectively, rather than in 1985 as the dataset used for the benchmark 
estimates. All these estimates again prove the robustness of the benchmark results.  
 
4.2 The effects of fiscal rules 
The results in the previous sub-section prove that the aggressive use of discretionary fiscal policy 
tends to increases inflation instability. The adverse effects on economic welfare and growth of 
inflation instability have been extensively documented in the literature (see, among others, Fountas et 
al. 2006). We are now going to investigate whether the existence of fiscal rules can mitigate those 
adverse effects by affecting the relationship between discretionary policy and inflation volatility. 
We estimate a more comprehensive version of model (4) that includes among the right-hand-side 
variables a measure of fiscal rules, and its interaction with discretionary fiscal policy. The model is 
the following: 
 
,[ , 2] 1 ,[ , 2] 2 ,[ , 2] 3 ,[ , 2] 1 ,[ , 2] ,ln _ _ _ * _
infl
i t t i t t i t t i t t i t t i t i tdiscr fp rule discr fp rule                 W  (5) 
 
The only difference between model (4) and model (5) lies in the two new variables accounting for 
the existence of fiscal rules: rule_ (we use again the five indices separately), and its interaction term 
with discretionary fiscal policy, discr_fp*rule_. The system-GMM estimator is used and the 
 23 
interaction term between discretionary policy and fiscal rules is treated as endogenous as done above 
for model (3).  
Table 6 contains the results of model (5) with discr_gpe as the measure of discretionary fiscal 
policy and the five types of fiscal rules are used separately one at a time. Table 7 shows the estimates 
when discr_gc is used instead.  
 
INSERT TABLES 6&7 ABOUT HERE 
 
The discr_gpe coefficients are always positive and statistically significant in three cases out of 
five (Table 6), while those associated with discr_gc (Table 7) are also always positive, and in all but 
one specifications significantly different from zero. This suggests that when there are no fiscal rules 
the aggressive use of spending items mostly pertaining to government consumption, are inflation-
destabilising.  
As for the role of fiscal rules, we can conclude that the overall lack of statistical significance of 
the coefficients associated with the rules’ indices and with the interaction terms between such rules 
and discretionary policy points towards a lack of influence of fiscal rules in this case. Diagnostic tests 
do not reveal specific problems, as the null hypotheses of both the Hansen J test statistic and of the 
AR(2) test are not rejected in any case. 
All in all, we conclude that discretionary policy can hardly enhance inflation stability even when 
coupled with fiscal rules. More precisely, it emerges an inflation-destabilising role of discretionary 
fiscal policy, in particular that related to consumption and investment categories of the budget. This 
marks a stark difference from our findings on the relationship between aggressive use of fiscal policy 
and output stability. In that case we found that fiscal rules were capable of changing the nature of the 
relationship from being output-destabilising to being output-stabilising. However, the lack of 
influence of fiscal rules in the case of inflation volatility seems legitimate, given that the task of 
maintaining a stable inflation rate is in the hands of central banks, rather than governments. As 
recently suggested by Combes et al. (2014), central bank independence, often along with some form 
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of inflation targeting, is thought to have played a key role in achieving low and stable inflation rates in 
advanced economies.  
 
5. Summary and conclusions 
In times of large deficits and growing public debt in advanced countries, economists, policy makers, 
and the media are all engaged in a stimulating debate on how to keep under control government 
national accounts and public finances. As a result, the economic literature now offers a number of 
recent theoretical and empirical studies dealing with the effectiveness of national fiscal rules as a 
measure to ensure fiscal discipline. We contribute to this debate by studying the impact of such rules 
on one of the main objectives of fiscal policy, namely the macroeconomic stabilisation function, 
rather than investigating their pure disciplinary effects. 
We firstly estimate three alternative measures of discretionary fiscal policy using three 
government expenditure series in an econometric model designed to disentangle their cyclical and 
structural components. Then, we test the relationship between discretionary fiscal policy and 
macroeconomic stability with annual panel data. Finally, and most importantly, we study how this 
relationship is affected by the existence of national fiscal rules.   
Our results suggest that the aggressive use of fiscal policy is both output- and inflation-
destabilising. More importantly, we find that the introduction of fiscal rules significantly affects the 
stabilisation function of fiscal policy. In particular, stringent fiscal rules are capable of making 
discretionary policy output-stabilising, and this is another key result of the analysis: in order 
significantly affect output volatility, fiscal rules need to be strict enough. Among the various types of 
rules, those on balanced budgets seem to be the most effective, and those on revenues the least 
effective. On the other hand, rules are unable to mitigate the inflation-destabilising effects of 
discretionary policy regardless of their type or their degree of stringency. 
Overall, our findings bear interesting policy implications. The governments of most advanced 
countries responded to the 2007-09 financial crisis by implementing significant financial stimulus 
programs, but due to the ensuing great recession, this led to widespread fiscal imbalances. This 
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situation fuelled the debate on the implementation of fiscal rules to ensure fiscal discipline and 
budgetary consolidation. Our results suggest that adequately strict fiscal rules, particularly if targeting 
balanced budgets, can affect the stabilisation function of fiscal policy. More precisely, rules can 
reduce the output-destabilising effects of discretionary fiscal policy, but they cannot affect the impact 
of the latter on inflation volatility. Since there is evidence of adverse welfare and growth effects of 
output volatility, this may imply a beneficial role of fiscal rules additional to the disciplinary one, if 
any.  
This welfare-enhancing effect of fiscal rules seems to be particularly relevant given that austerity 
policies aimed at restoring fiscal discipline are resulting in spending cuts and tax increases adversely 
affecting economic growth (IMF 2012). Our results suggest that the existence of rules guiding the 
policy-makers behaviour may mitigate those adverse effects.  
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Figures 1a-e: marginal effects of discr_gpe on GDP volatility depending on fiscal rules 
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1b. Marginal Effect of discr_gpe on GDP volatility As rule_r Changes
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1c. Marginal Effect of discr_gpe on GDP volatility As rule_bb Changes
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1d. Marginal Effect of discr_gpe on GDP volatility As rule_d Changes
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Figures 2a-e: marginal effects of discr_gc on GDP volatility depending on fiscal rules 
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2b. Marginal Effect of discr_gc on GDP volatility As rule_r Changes
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2c. Marginal Effect of discr_gc on GDP volatility As rule_bb Changes
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2d. Marginal Effect of discr_gc on GDP volatility As rule_d Changes
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2e. Marginal Effect of discr_gc on GDP volatility As rule_overall Changes
 
 
 
 
Table 1: pairwise correlations among the three measures of discretionary fiscal policy 
discr_gc discr_gci discr_gpe
discr_gc 1
discr_gci 0.8398* 1
discr_gpe 0.4589* 0.3097* 1  
Note: * denotes significance at 1%. 
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Table 2: model (2), three different measures of discretionary policy 
discr_gpe discr_gci discr_gc discr_gpe discr_gci discr_gc
discr_fp 9.26 21.1* 29.2** 60.0*** 34.5** 35.8**
(1.28) (1.68) (2.32) (3.52) -2.370 (2.47)
gov_size 0.015 0.0097 0.018 0.19** 0.046 0.047*
(0.51) (0.41) (0.87) (2.53) -1.510 (1.95)
open -0.0075 -0.011 -0.025* -0.014 -0.012 -0.022
(-0.47) (-0.73) (-1.81) (-0.34) (-0.58) (-1.27)
gdp_level 0.77 0.84* 0.86* 2.15** 1.60*** 1.26**
(1.28) (1.72) (1.72) (2.32) -3.010 (2.37)
period_1 -1.00 -1.23 -1.78** -3.00 -1.43 -2.09*
(-0.88) (-1.31) (-2.22) (-1.60) (-1.22) (-1.86)
period_2 -1.89*** -1.99*** -1.99*** -4.22*** -2.65*** -2.69***
(-4.30) (-5.24) (-5.44) (-5.48) (-5.43) (-6.03)
period_3 -1.63*** -1.62*** -1.60*** -4.45*** -2.50*** -2.40***
(-4.12) (-4.50) (-4.61) (-6.87) (-4.74) (-5.16)
period_4 -1.71*** -1.63*** -1.56*** -3.76*** -2.38*** -2.24***
(-5.57) (-5.28) (-5.56) (-6.14) (-5.76) (-6.18)
period_5 -2.29*** -2.22*** -2.06*** -4.86*** -3.06*** -2.90***
(-7.58) (-8.19) (-6.55) (-8.11) (-8.78) (-7.76)
period_6 -1.97*** -1.96*** -1.82*** -3.96*** -2.62*** -2.56***
(-7.45) (-9.60) (-7.14) (-7.29) (-11.0) (-8.94)
period_7 -2.39*** -2.23*** -2.01*** -5.46*** -3.14*** -2.85***
(-7.68) (-7.39) (-5.96) (-7.84) (-7.82) (-6.71)
period_8 -2.24*** -2.15*** -1.92*** -4.69*** -2.96*** -2.74***
(-9.75) (-11.4) (-7.55) (-8.30) (-9.64) (-8.06)
No. of obs. 181 181 183 181 181 183
AR(2) 0.99 0.40 0.49 0.003 0.04 0.26
Hansen 0.92 0.96 0.97 0.98 0.94 0.93
Macro volatility: GDP Macro volatility: private GDP
 
Note: z-statistics in parenthesis based on country-level clustered standard errors. ***, **, * denote significance 
at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. p-values are reported for both the Hansen J and the AR(2) statistics. 
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Table 3: GDP volatility model (3), discretionary fiscal policy = discr_gpe 
Rules: rule_e rule_r rule_bb rule_d rule_overall
discr_gpe 13.1*** 12.9** 17.7*** 14.2*** 15.4***
(2.73) (2.35) (5.45) (2.98) (3.86)
interaction -4.34 -5.72*** -13.25*** -7.37** -7.49***
(-1.53) (-2.70) (-3.26) (-2.54) (-2.70)
rule_ 0.14 0.17** 0.33*** 0.23*** 0.22**
(1.46) (2.16) (2.87) (2.68) (2.24)
gov_size 0.010 0.008 0.002 0.005 0.003
(0.43) (0.34) (0.11) (0.25) (0.13)
open -0.007 -0.002 -0.009 -0.002 -0.002
(-0.75) (-0.15) (-0.98) (-0.21) (-0.17)
gdp_level 0.57 0.79 0.55 0.63 0.65
(1.17) (1.57) (1.27) (1.56) (1.41)
No. of obs. 181 181 181 181 181
AR(2) 0.95 0.95 0.82 0.94 0.99
Hansen 0.999 0.999 1.00 1.00 1.00  
Note: z-statistics in parenthesis based on country-level clustered standard errors. ***, **, * denote significance 
at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. p-values are reported for both the Hansen J and the AR(2) statistics. Period 
dummies included but not reported for the sake of brevity. 
 
 
 
Table 4: GDP volatility model (3), discretionary fiscal policy = discr_gc 
Rules: rule_e rule_r rule_bb rule_d rule_overall
discr_gc 26.6*** 29.5*** 31.0*** 31.6*** 29.7***
(2.63) (3.29) (3.70) (3.62) (3.90)
interaction -1.31 -5.59*** -4.83 -7.12*** -3.81
(-0.42) (-3.09) (-1.11) (-3.24) (-1.31)
rule_ 0.043 0.127** 0.093 0.191*** 0.088
(0.77) (2.19) (0.88) (2.64) (1.35)
gov_size 0.013 0.012 0.011 0.008 0.012
(0.63) (0.51) (0.59) (0.35) (0.58)
open -0.026** -0.016 -0.023** -0.013 -0.021*
(-2.20) (-1.05) (-2.07) (-0.83) (-1.64)
gdp_level 0.69 0.99** 0.71 0.96** 0.81*
(1.44) (2.01) (1.61) (2.12) (1.79)
No. of obs. 183 183 183 183 183
AR(2) 0.47 0.46 0.36 0.50 0.41
Hansen 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00  
Note: z-statistics in parenthesis based on country-level clustered standard errors. ***, **, * denote significance 
at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. p-values are reported for both the Hansen J and the AR(2) statistics. Period 
dummies included but not reported for the sake of brevity. 
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Table 5: model (4), three different measures of discretionary policy 
discr_gpe discr_gci discr_gc
discr_fp 8.03 11.4** 28.1***
(1.18) (2.21) (2.77)
gov_size 0.069* 0.077* 0.085*
(1.94) (1.87) (1.86)
open -0.030* -0.042** -0.061***
(-1.73) (-2.09) (-2.78)
infl_level 0.18*** 0.20*** 0.21***
(3.43) (3.17) (3.70)
gap_vol 0.017 -0.12 -0.46**
(0.090) (-0.49) (-1.97)
exch_vol -0.016 0.0061 0.049
(-0.38) (0.16) (1.17)
money_vol 0.029** 0.026** 0.025***
(2.28) (2.47) (2.65)
period_1 0.34 -0.85 -2.46*
(0.43) (-0.82) (-1.84)
period_2 -0.38 -0.83 -1.56**
(-0.63) (-1.13) (-2.18)
period_3 -0.14 -0.47 -1.05
(-0.27) (-0.71) (-1.59)
period_4 -0.16 -0.39 -0.82
(-0.39) (-0.71) (-1.39)
period_5 0.19 -0.036 -0.50
(0.52) (-0.081) (-1.21)
period_6 0.38 0.18 -0.23
(1.20) (0.50) (-0.61)
period_7 -0.017 -0.18 -0.48
(-0.058) (-0.46) (-1.27)
period_8 -0.043 -0.21 -0.48
(-0.14) (-0.59) (-1.41)
No. of obs. 152 152 152
AR(2) 0.53 0.37 0.86
Hansen 1.00 1.00 1.00
Macro volatility: inflation
 
Note: z-statistics in parenthesis based on country-level clustered standard errors. ***, **, * denote significance 
at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. p-values are reported for both the Hansen J and the AR(2) statistics.  
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Table 6: model (5), discretionary fiscal policy = discr_gpe 
Rules: rule_e rule_r rule_bb rule_d rule_overall
discr_gpe 7.9 11.0* 15.7 7.5 9.3
(1.54) (1.82) (1.57) (1.10) (1.62)
interaction -2.77* -2.63 -9.95 1.11 -2.86
(-1.70) (-1.07) (-1.24) (0.24) (-1.34)
rule_ 0.036 0.087 0.198 0.052 0.067
(0.58) (0.85) (1.14) (0.39) (0.95)
gov_size 0.036 0.050* 0.047* 0.050* 0.042*
(1.53) (1.87) (1.67) (1.88) (1.64)
open -0.012 -0.019 -0.025* -0.019 -0.016
(-0.79) (-1.16) (-1.86) (-1.38) (-1.12)
infl_level 0.16*** 0.17**** 0.17*** 0.162*** 0.166***
(3.96) (4.01) (4.32) (3.99) (4.12)
gap_vol 0.134 0.083 -0.005 0.177 0.102
(0.96) (0.53) (-0.02) (1.14) (0.67)
exch_vol -0.032 -0.028 -0.016 -0.042 -0.029
(-0.69) (-0.60) (-0.43) (-0.95) (-0.66)
money_vol 0.025* 0.027* 0.025* 0.026** 0.026*
(1.70) (1.92) (1.78) (2.07) (1.80)
No. of obs. 152 152 152 152 152
AR(2) 0.49 0.50 0.78 0.62 0.52
Hansen 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00  
Note: z-statistics in parenthesis based on country-level clustered standard errors. **, * denote significance at 
5%, and 10% respectively. p-values are reported for both the Hansen J and the AR(2) statistics. Period dummies 
included but not reported for the sake of brevity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 42 
Table 7: model (5), discretionary fiscal policy = discr_gc 
Rules: rule_e rule_r rule_bb rule_d rule_overall
discr_gc 19.3*** 19.0*** 10.3* 13.8*** 15.3**
(3.66) (3.94) (1.71) (2.69) (2.52)
interaction -0.67 0.56 5.96 3.62 2.98
(-0.20) (0.18) (1.43) (1.14) (0.82)
rule_ -0.040 -0.042 -0.275 -0.116 -0.123
(-0.46) (-0.39) (-1.61) (-0.98) (-1.00)
gov_size 0.057* 0.052* 0.072* 0.051* 0.060*
(1.88) (1.94) (1.74) (1.71) (1.68)
open -0.039*** -0.033*** -0.046** -0.030** -0.037**
(-2.90) (-2.76) (-2.46) (-2.42) (-2.49)
infl_level 0.19*** 0.17*** 0.194*** 0.169*** 0.180***
(4.54) (4.02) (3.81) (3.87) (4.28)
gap_vol -0.211 -0.148 -0.188 -0.083 -0.163
(-1.03) (-0.87) (-0.77) (-0.45) (-0.70)
exch_vol 0.023 0.005 0.043 -0.002 0.015
(0.85) (0.15) (1.27) (-0.04) (0.50)
money_vol 0.024** 0.024** 0.026*** 0.025** 0.025**
(2.24) (2.18) (2.62) (2.33) (2.33)
No. of obs. 152 152 152 152 152
AR(2) 0.90 0.89 0.15 0.33 0.52
Hansen 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00  
Note: z-statistics in parenthesis based on country-level clustered standard errors. ***, **, * denote significance 
at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. p-values are reported for both the Hansen J and the AR(2) statistics. Period 
dummies included but not reported for the sake of brevity. 
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Appendix 
 
Series used in the first part of the analysis  
Government consumption (spending_gc). Government final consumption expenditure, expenditure 
approach. Source: OECD Economic Outlook (EO from now on) 93 (June 2013). 
Government consumption plus investment (spending_gci). spending_gc + government fixed capital 
formation, appropriation account. Source (of the latter): OECD EO 93. 
Government primary expenditure (spending_gpe). Total disbursements of the general government 
excluding gross government interest payments. Source (of both series): OECD EO 93. 
Inflation (π). Inflation calculated from the GDP deflator. Source: OECD EO 93. 
Real GDP (gdp). Logarithm of GDP, volume, at 2005 PPP USD. Source: OECD EO 93. 
Oil price (oil). Logarithm of the spot price of a barrel of oil. Source: Dow Jones & Company.  
 
Series used in the second part of the analysis 
GDP volatility (
gdp ). Standard deviation over three-year periods of the growth rate of real GDP per 
capita. Source: OECD EO 93 (GDP, volume at 2005 PPP USD). Source of the population series 
(pop): Penn World Tables (PWT from now on) 8.0. Feenstra, Robert C., Robert Inklaar and Marcel P. 
Timmer (2013), "The Next Generation of the Penn World Table" available for download at 
www.ggdc.net/pwt 
Inflation volatility (
infl ). Standard deviation of the inflation rate (calculated from the GDP deflator) 
over the three-year periods. Source: OECD EO 93. 
Discretionary fiscal policy (discr_gc, discr_gci, discr_gpe). Volatility over three-year periods of the 
residuals of the model estimated in the first part of the analysis (see Section 2 for details). 
Government size (gov_size). Ratio between government primary expenditure and GDP. Source: 
OECD EO 93. 
Openness (open). KOF globalization index (see Dreher 2006). Source: globalization.kof.ethz.ch 
Fiscal rules (rule_e, rule_r, rule_bb, rule_d, rule_overall). Rules’ indices taking values between zero 
and five (higher values stand for stricter rules) constructed as explained both in Section 3.2 and in 
Schaechter et al. (2012). Source: IMF-FAD Fiscal Rules Dataset. 
Dependency ratio (dep_ratio). Age dependency ratio (people younger than 15 or older than 64), 
percentage of working-age population (people aged 15-64). Source: World Development Indicators 
(WDI from now on). 
Urbanisation (urban). Urban population, percentage of the total population. Source: WDI. 
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Additional tables 
Table A1: sample descriptive statistics 
Mean Min Max Obs.
overall between within
gdp 1.522 1.024 0.431 0.932 0.278 6.616 186
private gdp_level (gpe) 3.762 2.862 1.241 2.596 0.392 20.346 184
private gdp_level (gci) 2.124 1.477 0.626 1.347 0.446 8.966 184
private gdp_level (gc) 2.008 1.378 0.530 1.275 0.435 8.609 186
inflation 1.247 1.402 0.923 1.067 0.093 12.567 186
discr_fp
discr_gpe 0.027 0.021 0.015 0.015 0.003 0.149 181
discr_gci 0.026 0.017 0.011 0.013 0.003 0.099 181
discr_gc 0.023 0.015 0.010 0.012 0.002 0.086 185
discr_rev 0.022 0.014 0.010 0.011 0.000 0.112 181
discr_nl 1.095 0.875 0.408 0.781 0.004 7.056 181
discr_canl 2.054 1.819 0.996 1.556 0.352 14.634 178
rule_
rule_e 1.031 1.430 0.982 1.058 0.000 5.000 189
rule_r 0.731 1.185 0.811 0.880 0.000 5.000 189
rule_bb 1.097 1.251 0.722 1.032 0.000 4.094 189
rule_d 0.733 1.142 0.809 0.823 0.000 3.913 189
rule_overall 1.068 1.350 0.858 1.056 0.000 4.266 189
gov_size 42.324 7.105 6.414 3.319 28.024 62.932 185
open 78.943 9.672 7.630 6.150 44.457 92.330 189
gdp_level 10.273 0.269 0.220 0.159 9.466 11.196 187
private gdp_level (gpe) 9.716 0.307 0.268 0.164 9.080 10.723 184
private gdp_level (gci) 10.011 0.279 0.243 0.152 9.281 10.990 184
private gdp_level (gc) 10.051 0.278 0.233 0.155 9.323 11.031 186
infl_level 3.069 3.257 1.861 2.688 -2.230 25.539 185
gap_vol 1.146 0.778 0.320 0.712 0.125 5.031 171
exch_vol 2.749 2.104 1.131 1.792 0.462 14.081 171
money_vol 4.904 5.955 2.835 5.250 0.514 43.763 180
Standard deviationVariables
Macroeconomic volatility
 
Note: descriptive statistics are based on nine three-year averages periods for 21 countries (see footnote 10). 
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Table A2: model (2), 2SLS estimates, discretionary fiscal policy = discr_gc 
Estimator:
GDP private GDP GDP private GDP
discr_fp 29.2** 35.8** 41.9** 53.4*
(2.32) (2.47) (2.01) (1.95)
gov_size 0.018 0.047* -0.099* -0.14**
(0.87) (1.95) (-1.93) (-2.06)
open -0.025* -0.022 0.048 0.081
(-1.81) (-1.27) (1.09) (1.68)
gdp_level 0.86* 1.26** -1.44 -1.90
(1.72) (2.37) (-0.81) (-0.80)
period_1 -1.78** -2.09*
(-2.22) (-1.86)
period_2 -1.99*** -2.69***
(-5.44) (-6.03)
period_3 -1.60*** -2.40*** -1.60** -2.43**
(-4.61) (-5.16) (-2.14) (-2.31)
period_4 -1.56*** -2.24*** -1.81*** -2.63***
(-5.56) (-6.18) (-3.11) (-3.09)
period_5 -2.06*** -2.90*** -2.61*** -3.76***
(-6.55) (-7.76) (-5.22) (-5.24)
period_6 -1.82*** -2.56*** -2.49*** -3.61***
(-7.14) (-8.94) (-6.47) (-6.80)
period_7 -2.01*** -2.85*** -2.30*** -3.34***
(-5.96) (-6.71) (-6.68) (-6.38)
period_8 -1.92*** -2.74*** -2.21*** -3.23***
(-7.55) (-8.06) (-7.72) (-7.13)
No. of obs. 183 183 141 141
AR(2) - GMM 0.49 0.26
Hansen p -value - GMM 0.97 0.93
R squared 0.572 0.634
Hansen J 9.25 4.60
Hansen J p -value 0.099 0.47
K-P weak id. test 11.0* 11.0*
Macro volatility Macro volatility
Sys-GMM 2SLS
 
Note: t-statistics in parenthesis based on country-level clustered standard errors. ***, **, * denote significance 
at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. p-values are reported for both the Hansen J and the AR(2) statistics of the 
GMM estimates.  
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Table A3: first stage of the 2SLS estimates, discretionary fiscal policy = discr_gc 
Dependent variable: discr_fp gov_size
open -0.002*** 0.269
(-4.53) (1.52)
gdp_level 0.004 -5.111
(0.885) (-0.53)
l.discr_fp -0.200* -6.850
(-1.97) (-0.31)
l.gov_size 0.001*** 0.828***
(3.01) (8.12)
l2.discr_fp -0.171*** -15.319
(-2.95) (-0.62)
l2.gov_size -0.0004 -0.324***
(-0.84) (-3.42)
period_3 -0.024** 1.752
(-2.42) (0.36)
period_4 -0.023** -2.817
(-2.81) (-0.76)
period_5 -0.014** -4.095*
(-2.54) (-1.79)
period_6 -0.004 -3.965***
(-0.74) (-2.87)
period_7 -0.013*** -2.647***
(-3.21) (-2.88)
period_8 -0.013*** -4.996***
(-3.42) (-7.76)
pop -0.037 26.408
(-0.46) (1.30)
dep_ratio 0.00001 -0.026
(0.10) (-0.15)
urban 0.001 0.027
(1.48) (0.26)
No. of obs. 141 141  
Note: t-statistics in parenthesis based on country-level clustered standard errors. ***, **, * denote significance 
at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.  
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Table A4: models (2) and (4), three alternative measures of discretionary policy 
discr_rec discr_nl discr_canl discr_rec discr_nl discr_canl
discr_fp 22.2*** 0.21 0.087 20.3 0.099 0.17***
(3.49) (1.40) (1.15) (1.34) (0.59) (3.61)
gov_size 0.029 0.046 0.056 0.074** 0.064* 0.072*
(0.77) (1.17) (1.46) (1.98) (1.81) (1.77)
open -0.0023 -0.020 -0.023 -0.027 -0.027 -0.026
(-0.099) (-0.92) (-1.17) (-1.49) (-1.58) (-1.45)
gdp_level 1.22* 1.12 1.10
(1.75) (1.33) (1.64)
infl_level 0.16** 0.17*** 0.16***
(2.49) (2.98) (2.76)
gap_vol 0.077 0.10 -0.055
(0.39) (0.64) (-0.23)
exch_vol -0.034 -0.023 -0.019
(-0.91) (-0.48) (-0.35)
money_vol 0.032** 0.028** 0.021
(2.12) (1.98) (1.58)
No. of obs. 181 181 178 152 152 151
AR(2) 0.57 0.58 0.97 0.060 0.25 0.79
Hansen 0.97 0.91 0.93 1 1.00 1
Macro volatility: GDP Macro volatility: inflation
 
Note: z-statistics in parenthesis based on country-level clustered standard errors. ***, **, * denote significance 
at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. p-values are reported for both the Hansen J and the AR(2) statistics. Period 
dummies included but not reported for the sake of brevity. 
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Table A5: model (2), three different measures of discretionary policy, 4-year periods 
discr_gpe discr_gci discr_gc discr_gpe discr_gci discr_gc
discr_fp 7.93 22.7* 26.8** 87.7*** 29.1* 28.1**
(1.14) (1.69) (2.24) (3.51) (1.93) (2.02)
gov_size 0.041 0.041 0.043* 0.20* 0.10** 0.092***
(0.98) (1.35) (1.67) (1.80) (2.37) (2.64)
open -0.0038 -0.017 -0.027 0.031 -0.027 -0.032
(-0.14) (-0.82) (-1.31) (0.55) (-0.80) (-1.10)
gdp_level 1.49* 1.29* 1.28*** 3.04** 2.48*** 1.80***
(1.68) (1.86) (2.63) (2.43) (2.91) (3.45)
period_1 1.02 -0.081 -0.42 0.55 0.26 -0.62
(0.64) (-0.072) (-0.58) (0.23) (0.16) (-0.59)
period_2 -0.83* -1.09*** -1.15*** -2.12*** -1.44** -1.64***
(-1.66) (-2.84) (-3.39) (-3.14) (-2.36) (-3.72)
period_3 -0.81** -0.97*** -0.97*** -2.14*** -1.38*** -1.42***
(-1.97) (-2.82) (-3.23) (-3.53) (-3.00) (-3.78)
period_4 -1.49*** -1.48*** -1.42*** -3.14*** -1.90*** -1.94***
(-4.68) (-5.56) (-5.31) (-5.25) (-5.69) (-6.09)
period_5 -1.31*** -1.27*** -1.21*** -3.08*** -1.66*** -1.66***
(-4.98) (-5.43) (-5.01) (-5.78) (-5.53) (-5.38)
period_6 -1.54*** -1.42*** -1.32*** -3.21*** -1.90*** -1.83***
(-6.78) (-6.64) (-5.67) (-6.01) (-6.21) (-5.95)
No. of obs. 143 143 145 143 143 145
AR(2) 0.42 0.17 0.089 0.66 0.70 0.42
Hansen 0.84 0.78 0.83 0.91 0.42 0.70
Macro volatility: GDP Macro volatility: private GDP
 
Note: z-statistics in parenthesis based on country-level clustered standard errors. ***, **, * denote significance 
at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. p-values are reported for both the Hansen J and the AR(2) statistics. 
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Table A6: model (2), three different measures of discretionary policy, 2-year periods 
discr_gpe discr_gci discr_gc discr_gpe discr_gci discr_gc
discr_fp 5.26 19.8* 29.4*** 105*** 31.2*** 38.6***
(1.57) (1.74) (2.81) (8.27) (2.60) (3.26)
gov_size 0.034 0.029 0.032* 0.18*** 0.074*** 0.067***
(1.47) (1.29) (1.72) (3.58) (2.71) (3.00)
open -0.031* -0.013 -0.036*** -0.073* -0.022 -0.043**
(-1.94) (-0.76) (-2.71) (-1.90) (-0.96) (-2.53)
gdp_level 0.53 1.17* 0.73 0.18 1.95*** 1.08**
(0.92) (1.78) (1.60) (0.14) (2.82) (2.57)
period_1 -0.93 1.34 -1.27 -8.66*** 1.41 -1.65
(-0.82) (0.85) (-1.34) (-2.83) (0.70) (-1.22)
period_2 -1.06** -0.90** -1.51*** -3.90*** -1.24** -1.93***
(-2.50) (-2.16) (-4.35) (-2.94) (-2.14) (-4.20)
period_3 -1.10*** -0.86** -1.33*** -3.51*** -1.09** -1.67***
(-2.85) (-2.10) (-3.74) (-3.42) (-2.09) (-3.92)
period_4 -0.67* -0.49 -0.86** -3.66*** -0.98* -1.30***
(-1.75) (-1.28) (-2.14) (-3.84) (-1.76) (-2.68)
period_5 -0.49 -0.43 -0.73** -2.70*** -0.80 -1.07**
(-1.41) (-1.11) (-2.22) (-3.29) (-1.63) (-2.45)
period_6 -0.77*** -0.60** -0.87*** -2.93*** -0.97** -1.18***
(-2.66) (-2.17) (-3.18) (-3.70) (-2.35) (-3.21)
period_7 -1.04*** -1.13*** -1.27*** -2.74*** -1.52*** -1.62***
(-3.93) (-4.08) (-5.02) (-3.55) (-4.53) (-5.49)
period_8 -1.16*** -1.30*** -1.44*** -2.92*** -1.78*** -1.93***
(-4.82) (-4.81) (-5.40) (-4.41) (-6.30) (-6.48)
period_9 -0.48** -0.65** -0.71*** -1.96*** -0.82*** -0.92***
(-1.99) (-2.54) (-2.77) (-3.18) (-3.33) (-3.60)
period_10 -1.15*** -1.20*** -1.22*** -3.48*** -1.71*** -1.62***
(-5.46) (-6.19) (-5.86) (-5.44) (-6.93) (-6.30)
period_11 -1.19*** -1.30*** -1.28*** -2.80*** -1.78*** -1.67***
(-5.81) (-6.14) (-6.49) (-7.25) (-7.12) (-7.01)
period_12 -0.75*** -0.99*** -0.96*** -2.03*** -1.36*** -1.26***
(-4.16) (-5.16) (-5.90) (-2.97) (-6.34) (-5.64)
period_13 1.20*** 0.94*** 0.68** 0.40 1.22*** 0.96***
(7.11) (4.24) (2.33) (0.45) (3.79) (2.78)
No. of obs. 280 281 283 280 281 283
AR(2) 0.019 0.014 0.033 0.57 0.037 0.077
Hansen 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Macro volatility: GDP Macro volatility: private GDP
 
Note: z-statistics in parenthesis based on country-level clustered standard errors. ***, **, * denote significance 
at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. p-values are reported for both the Hansen J and the AR(2) statistics. 
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Table A7: model (2), three different measures of fiscal policy, two alternative 3-year datasets 
discr_gpe discr_gci discr_gc discr_gpe discr_gci discr_gc discr_gpe discr_gci discr_gc discr_gpe discr_gci discr_gc
discr_fp 3.48 13.7 23.8* 15.7*** 18.0* 32.4* 105*** 29.3** 30.3* 63.2*** 29.3** 36.8**
(0.75) (1.28) (1.72) (2.73) (1.67) (1.94) (5.45) (2.46) (1.88) (4.15) (2.46) (1.98)
gov_size 0.045 0.054* 0.050* 0.045 0.044* 0.032 0.14 0.090*** 0.087*** 0.19*** 0.09*** 0.079***
(1.56) (1.86) (1.89) (1.38) (1.69) (1.56) (1.47) (3.35) (3.11) (2.58) (3.35) (3.53)
open -0.033* -0.023 -0.027 -0.012 -0.0087 -0.023 -0.0059 -0.024 -0.032 -0.045 -0.024 -0.030
(-1.89) (-1.10) (-1.30) (-0.67) (-0.51) (-1.48) (-0.16) (-1.14) (-1.28) (-1.54) (-1.14) (-1.43)
gdp_level 0.72 1.29** 1.39*** 0.78 1.21* 1.03** 1.19 1.89*** 1.78*** 1.43 1.89*** 1.44***
(1.47) (2.01) (2.61) (1.32) (1.83) (2.13) (0.83) (2.67) (3.68) (1.15) (2.67) (3.05)
period_1 -0.95 0.39 0.31 -0.56 0.20 -0.88 -2.99 -0.52 -0.15 -3.39 -0.52 -1.17
(-1.38) (0.33) (0.39) (-0.56) (0.15) (-1.00) (-1.25) (-0.38) (-0.16) (-1.39) (-0.38) (-1.03)
period_2 -1.18*** -0.89** -0.87** -1.22*** -1.06*** -1.20*** -2.39** -1.64*** -1.29*** -3.35*** -1.64*** -1.74***
(-3.34) (-2.36) (-2.46) (-3.53) (-2.88) (-3.57) (-2.37) (-2.88) (-2.85) (-4.43) (-2.88) (-4.00)
period_3 -0.84** -0.63* -0.59* -0.96*** -0.86*** -0.90*** -2.21*** -1.44*** -1.08** -2.35*** -1.44*** -1.40***
(-2.48) (-1.79) (-1.73) (-3.11) (-2.68) (-3.25) (-2.97) (-3.46) (-2.46) (-3.70) (-3.346) (-3.86)
period_4 -1.16*** -0.93*** -0.85*** -1.59*** -1.51*** -1.47*** -2.30*** -2.02*** -1.26*** -3.08*** -2.02*** -1.94***
(-4.55) (-3.07) (-2.75) (-5.76) (-4.71) (-5.08) (-3.43) (-5.41) (-3.34) (-6.22) (-5.41) (-5.79)
period_5 -1.37*** -1.24*** -1.17*** -1.52*** -1.55*** -1.55*** -2.90*** -2.06*** -1.72*** -2.91*** -2.06*** -2.09***
(-5.03) (-4.97) (-4.36) (-6.41) (-6.57) (-6.21) (-3.80) (-7.38) (-5.48) (-6.08) (-7.38) (-7.05)
period_6 -1.02*** -0.93*** -0.86*** -1.50*** -1.49*** -1.36*** -2.39*** -1.99*** -1.27*** -3.28*** -1.99*** -1.84***
(-4.05) (-3.85) (-3.36) (-5.95) (-5.78) (-5.60) (-3.64) (-6.07) (-4.39) (-7.09) (-6.07) (-5.82)
period_7 -1.43*** -1.31*** -1.20*** -1.77*** -1.83*** -1.65*** -2.88*** -2.38*** -1.65*** -3.34*** -2.38*** -2.21***
(-5.20) (-4.91) (-4.04) (-7.65) (-7.31) (-6.37) (-4.44) (-6.80) (-4.31) (-7.12) (-6.80) (-6.23)
period_8 -0.31* -0.30* -0.25 -1.06* 163 -0.42**
(-1.75) (-1.85) (-1.55) (-1.74) 21 (-2.03)
No. of obs. 183 183 185 163 163 165 183 183 185 163 163 165
AR(2) 0.42 0.92 0.47 0.27 0.24 0.62 0.10 0.67 0.85 0.088 0.15 0.96
Hansen 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.90 0.98 0.79 1.00 0.99 0.98 0.65 0.95 0.92
Alternative 1 Alternative 2
Macro volatility: GDP Macro volatility: private GDP
Alternative 1 Alternative 2
 
Note: z-statistics in parenthesis based on country-level clustered standard errors. ***, **, * denote significance 
at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. p-values are reported for both the Hansen J and the AR(2) statistics. The 
Alternative 1 dataset starts in 1986, and the Alternative 2 dataset starts in 1987 (the benchmark dataset starts in 
1985). 
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Table A8: model (4), three different measures of discretionary policy, 4-year periods 
discr_gpe discr_gci discr_gc
discr_fp 14.6*** 12.1*** 19.2***
(4.09) (3.22) (3.52)
gov_size 0.067** 0.056* 0.066**
(1.98) (1.80) (1.96)
open -0.021 -0.015 -0.029*
(-1.31) (-1.08) (-1.94)
infl_level 0.17*** 0.13** 0.14***
(2.73) (2.45) (3.25)
gap_vol 0.022 0.15 -0.0040
(0.12) (0.69) (-0.019)
exch_vol -0.012 -0.016 0.0065
(-0.33) (-0.41) (0.19)
money_vol 0.027** 0.022** 0.024**
(2.50) (2.26) (2.50)
period_1 1.07 1.24 0.44
(0.94) (1.34) (0.53)
period_2 -0.16 -0.014 -0.34
(-0.33) (-0.034) (-0.77)
period_3 0.050 0.14 -0.12
(0.15) (0.37) (-0.29)
period_4 0.46 0.53 0.33
(1.50) (1.44) (0.88)
period_5 0.31 0.36 0.21
(1.27) (1.10) (0.66)
period_6 0.15 0.18 0.100
(0.53) (0.57) (0.31)
No. of obs. 118 118 118
AR(2) 0.38 0.42 0.32
Hansen 1.00 0.95 1.00
Macro volatility: inflation
 
Note: z-statistics in parenthesis based on country-level clustered standard errors. ***, **, * denote significance 
at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. p-values are reported for both the Hansen J and the AR(2) statistics. 
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Table A9: model (4), three different measures of discretionary policy, 2-year periods 
discr_gpe discr_gci discr_gc
discr_fp 7.18*** 23.4** 37.6**
(4.60) (2.07) (2.42)
gov_size 0.063* 0.058* 0.065*
(1.69) (1.96) (1.78)
open -0.024 -0.034** -0.053**
(-1.20) (-2.05) (-2.40)
infl_level 0.11* 0.14*** 0.16***
(1.92) (3.76) (3.48)
gap_vol 0.16 -0.11 -0.32
(0.80) (-0.49) (-1.13)
exch_vol -0.0043 0.028 0.091*
(-0.078) (0.62) (1.69)
money_vol 0.019* 0.015 0.012
(1.88) (1.61) (1.36)
period_1 1.37 -0.72 -2.27*
(1.05) (-0.74) (-1.87)
period_2 0.74* -0.25 -0.70
(1.75) (-0.56) (-1.41)
period_3 0.12 -0.70* -0.97**
(0.28) (-1.74) (-2.13)
period_4 0.34 -0.35 -0.54
(1.06) (-0.88) (-1.36)
period_5 0.28 -0.39 -0.52
(1.22) (-0.97) (-1.35)
period_6 0.38 -0.14 -0.28
(1.48) (-0.40) (-0.77)
period_7 0.56*** -0.089 -0.24
(3.13) (-0.26) (-0.71)
period_8 0.67* 0.099 0.010
(1.84) (0.28) (0.031)
period_9 0.74 0.24 0.28
(1.34) (0.45) (0.58)
period_10 0.49** 0.092 0.18
(1.98) (0.38) (0.79)
period_11 0.23 -0.22 -0.12
(1.13) (-1.00) (-0.58)
period_12 0.36 -0.18 -0.067
(1.56) (-1.07) (-0.33)
period_13 0.062 0.028 0.073
(0.24) (0.11) (0.27)
No. of obs. 230 231 231
AR(2) 0.084 0.096 0.16
Hansen 1.00 1.00 1.00
Macro volatility: inflation
 
Note: z-statistics in parenthesis based on country-level clustered standard errors. ***, **, * denote significance 
at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. p-values are reported for both the Hansen J and the AR(2) statistics. 
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Table A10: model (4), three different measures of fiscal policy, two alternative 3-year datasets 
discr_gpe discr_gci discr_gc discr_gpe discr_gci discr_gc
discr_fp 5.96** 9.51* 19.2** 19.6** 22.7* 44.6**
(2.41) (1.70) (2.37) (2.06) (1.95) (2.04)
gov_size 0.094** 0.074* 0.085* 0.082* 0.052* 0.064*
(2.12) (1.94) (1.87) (1.86) (1.90) (1.85)
open -0.033 -0.033 -0.050* -0.031 -0.034* -0.063**
(-1.27) (-1.43) (-1.91) (-1.41) (-1.76) (-2.27)
infl_level 0.15* 0.16** 0.18*** 0.22** 0.21** 0.24**
(1.86) (2.30) (2.72) (2.13) (2.13) (2.40)
gap_vol 0.024 0.026 -0.13 -0.0071 -0.017 -0.36
(0.084) (0.10) (-0.46) (-0.026) (-0.060) (-1.08)
exch_vol 0.039 0.047 0.077* 0.021 -0.0093 0.014
(0.88) (1.13) (1.72) (0.46) (-0.25) (0.31)
money_vol 0.030*** 0.028*** 0.030*** 0.018* 0.011 0.015
(3.19) (3.15) (3.33) (1.71) (0.99) (1.32)
period_1 1.07 0.18 -0.82 0.28 -0.61 -2.07
(0.74) (0.18) (-0.72) (0.27) (-0.54) (-1.48)
period_2 -0.20 -0.33 -0.67 -0.59 -0.62 -1.27
(-0.23) (-0.54) (-0.97) (-0.82) (-0.91) (-1.52)
period_3 0.096 0.014 -0.25 -0.46 -0.41 -0.90
(0.14) (0.029) (-0.45) (-0.89) (-0.74) (-1.28)
period_4 0.25 0.23 0.092 0.070 0.097 -0.32
(0.45) (0.62) (0.22) (0.16) (0.24) (-0.62)
period_5 0.57 0.46 0.36 0.24 0.18 -0.20
(1.11) (1.43) (1.01) (0.63) (0.54) (-0.49)
period_6 0.50 0.40 0.34 0.086 0.095 -0.093
(1.12) (1.18) (1.03) (0.32) (0.40) (-0.31)
period_7 0.29 0.22 0.23 -0.100 -0.16 -0.31
(0.58) (0.77) (0.65) (-0.25) (-0.46) (-0.75)
period_8 0.38 0.28* 0.30
(1.12) (1.65) (1.25)
No. of obs. 150 150 150 134 134 134
AR(2) 0.24 0.29 0.24 0.47 0.80 0.95
Hansen 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Macro volatility: inflation
Alternative 1 Alternative 2
 
Note: z-statistics in parenthesis based on country-level clustered standard errors. ***, **, * denote significance 
at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. p-values are reported for both the Hansen J and the AR(2) statistics. The 
Alternative 1 dataset starts in 1986, and the Alternative 2 dataset starts in 1987 (the benchmark dataset starts in 
1985). 
 
